APPEAL BOARD DECISION APPEARANCES FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Esq., Deputy Chief Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Pro se The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On November 13, 2023, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). Applicant elected a decision based on the written record. The Government submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM) containing the entire record and the Government’s argument. Applicant was provided an opportunity to respond. His response to the FORM was admitted into the record. On May 15, 2024, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Carol G. Ricciardello denied Applicant’s security clearance eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Department Counsel filed a reply brief. Under Guideline F, the SOR alleged that Applicant had two delinquent credit card debts totaling nearly $20,000 and that Applicant failed to timely file Federal income tax returns for tax years 2020, 2021, and 2022. Applicant admitted all of the SOR allegations with explanations. The Judge found in Applicant’s favor on the tax allegations and against him on the two delinquent debt allegations. On appeal, Applicant asserts that the Judge erred by not convening a hearing when Applicant had expressed a willingness to attend one and failed to consider all of the evidence in mitigation. Consistent with the following, we affirm. Judge’s Findings of Fact and Analysis Applicant is in his late 30s. He earned a bachelor’s and master’s degrees and honorably served in the military from 2003 to 2015. He married in 2004 and divorced in 2006, and he has an 18 year old child. Applicant mitigated the tax allegations. With regard to the two delinquent debts alleged in the SOR, Applicant admitted both, and said he faithfully paid the accounts for ten years. In 2016, after separating from the military, Applicant defaulted on the debts, which were charged off and placed for collection. He argued that he had no creditor to pay for the charged-off debt and did not provide any evidence of efforts he may have made in the past seven years to resolve the debt with the original creditor. The other debt was sent to a collection agency in 2022, and Applicant did not provide evidence of efforts to resolve it from 2016 to 2022. He said the collection agent offered a settlement, but Applicant wanted a written promise from the agency that it will be removed from his credit report. The Judge held that Applicant failed to resolve his delinquent debts, and they remain current and overdue. She found that Applicant has not taken any significant action to resolve the debts, and he did not contact the creditor on one debt, even when it was clear it was a security concern. He also failed to provide an update on efforts to address the settlement offer on the other debt. His answer to Government interrogatories stating that he is working to have the credit card debt removed from his credit report since they are over seven years old, is an indication that he does not intend to resolve the debts themselves. The Judge noted that, “[b]ecause Applicant requested a determination on the record without a hearing, I had no opportunity to question him about the specifics of his actions and whether he made any additional effort to resolve his delinquent debts or evaluate his credibility and sincerity based on demeanor.” She held that the debts remain on his current credit report and Applicant has not acted responsibly. There is no evidence he received financial counselling or that there are clear indications the problem is being resolved, and no good-faith efforts were made in the past years to resolve the debts. Discussion The record confirms that Applicant received a copy of the FORM on February 5, 2024, and that the FORM itself and the accompanying cover letter advised Applicant regarding his right to respond. DOHA received Applicant’s response to the FORM on February 14, 2024, which was submitted to the Judge and entered into the record. On appeal, Applicant states that in his response to the SOR, he wrote: I wish to have the Administrative Judge issue a decision based upon the response and documents I have provided. If the Judge decides to hold a hearing. Please note that I will need to video conference into the hearing as I am outside of the United States. (Appeal Brief at 1, citing to Answer at 3.). 2 Applicant argues that the Judge “understood I was more than willing to answer any questions and clear up any information.” Appeal Brief at 1. He also asserts that he elected a decision without a hearing because he could not attend a hearing in person, and the documents sent to him did not give him “the best instructions as to what I should pick given my travel schedule.” He said the Judge “made no attempt or expressed the need for a hearing to understand and or see my sincerity in my responses.” Id. Applicant has not established that he was denied the due process afforded by the Directive. First, Applicant clearly and unequivocally elected a decision based on the written record. DOHA personnel have no authority to provide advice to applicants concerning what rights they should exercise and should refrain from going beyond the language of the Directive and, if applicable, the current Prehearing Guidance in their interactions with applicants. See ADP Case No. 18-00329 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 14, 2018). DOHA personnel must avoid making comments that may influence applicants in exercising their rights under the Directive. ISCR Case No. 20-01622 at 2 (App. Bd. Jun. 27, 2022). We find that Applicant was fully aware of his right to a hearing and knowingly waived that right. A Judge is not obligated to require a hearing, nor is she obligated to require that Applicant respond to inquiries outside of the FORM process. If an Applicant has not requested a hearing with his or her answer to the SOR, and Department Counsel has not requested a hearing within 20 days of receipt of the applicant’s answer, the case shall be assigned to the Administrative Judge for a clearance decision based on the written record. Directive E3.1.7. The Judge is an advocate for neither side and bases her decision on the evidence presented to her by the parties. See ISCR Case No. 12-10335 at 4 (App. Bd. Dec. 29, 2017). Next, after requesting a decision on the written record, Applicant received a copy of Department Counsel’s File of Relevant Material (FORM) and was given an opportunity to respond to the FORM and submit additional matters for the Judge to consider. He submitted a response to the FORM that included additional documentary evidence. Considering all the circumstances, the Board concludes Applicant knowingly waived his right to a hearing and received a reasonable opportunity to respond to the FORM, including the option to present additional evidence for consideration in his case. Absent a showing of factual or legal error that affects a party’s right to present evidence in the proceeding below, a party does not have the right to have a second chance at presenting his or her case before an administrative judge. See ISCR Case No. 14-02730 at 2 (App. Bd. Jun. 24, 2016). Finally, the remainder of Applicant’s brief amounts to a disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence. None of his arguments, however, are sufficient to establish the Judge weighed the evidence in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Directive ¶ E3.1.32.3. We have often stated that a security clearance adjudication is not a proceeding aimed at collecting an applicant’s debts. Rather, it is a proceeding aimed at evaluating an applicant’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. E.g., ISCR Case No. 07-08049 at 5 (App. Bd. Jul. 22, 2008). The scope of Guideline F encompasses not only an Applicant’s current financial situation, but also extends to his or her financial history. As a general rule, an applicant is not required to be debt-free nor to develop a plan for paying off all debts immediately or simultaneously. E.g., ISCR Case No. 09-08462 at 4 (App. Bd. May 31, 2011). However, an applicant must act responsibly given his or her circumstances and develop a reasonable plan for repayment, accompanied by concomitant conduct even if it may only provide for the payment of debts one at a time. ISCR 3 Case No. 07-06482 at 3 (App. Bd. May 21, 2008). With regard to additional or clarifying evidence presented on appeal, the Appeal Board is prohibited from considering new evidence on appeal and does not review cases de novo. Directive ¶ E3.1.29. Applicant failed to establish that the Judge committed any harmful error or that he should be granted any relief on appeal. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). See also AG ¶ 2(b): “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” ORDER The decision is AFFIRMED. 

APPEAL BOARD DECISION APPEARANCES FOR GOVERNMENT Julie R. Mendez, Esq., Chief Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Pro se The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On November 9, 2023, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On May 28, 2024, after conducting a hearing, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge John Bayard Glendon denied Applicant’s security clearance eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. The SOR alleges 13 financial concerns, and the Judge found against Applicant as to all but two of the allegations. On appeal, Applicant notes that the Judge found that Applicant “was not able to make payments from 2019 to 2020.” He further states that he “was still making all payment until 2020 pandemic covid started.” While not specifically articulated, this implies that the Judge made a factual error regarding when Applicant’s delinquencies began. Although Applicant does not cite to a specific portion of the Decision, it appears he is referring to the following sentence: “The debts alleged in the SOR are mostly credit-card accounts that he has been unable to pay since about 2019 or 2020.” Decision at 3. It is noteworthy that contrary to Applicant’s paraphrasing, the Judge concluded that Applicants delinquencies began “about 2019 or 2020.” (emphasis added). Applicant himself testified that before 2020, “I pretty much had a clean record with all my finances.” Transcript at 20. Thus, there is some ambiguity as to when Applicant’s financial problems began. Regardless, we do not evaluate a Judge's decision based on isolated words or sentences but, rather, on the decision viewed as a whole. ISCR Case No. 20-00204 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 2, 2022). Considering the totality of the facts of this case, it is of no significant consequence whether the delinquencies began in 2019 or 2020. Therefore, to the extent there may be error, it is harmless as it did not likely affect the outcome of the case. E.g., ISCR Case No. 95-0495 at 4 (App. Bd. Mar. 22, 1996). Applicant makes no other claims that can be interpreted as an assertion of error. The Appeal Board does not review cases de novo. Directive ¶ E3.1.29. The Board’s authority to review a case is limited to cases in which the appealing party has alleged the judge committed harmful error. We have considered the entirety of Applicant’s arguments. The record supports a conclusion that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). The Judge’s adverse decision is sustainable on this record. “The general standard isthat a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security. AG ¶ 2(b). 2 ORDER The decision in ISCR Case No. 23-02203 is AFFIRMED. 

APPEAL BOARD DECISION APPEARANCES FOR GOVERNMENT Julie R. Mendez, Esq., Chief Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Pro se The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On October 5, 2023, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). Applicant elected to receive a decision based on the written record, without a hearing. On February 28, 2024, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Roger C. Wesley denied Applicant’s security clearance eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. The SOR alleged that Applicant has nine delinquent debts totaling about $42,000. The Judge found in Applicant’s favor on two debts, and against him on the remaining debts. In his appeal brief, Applicant points out factual errors in the Judge’s decision, asserts that the Judge failed to consider relevant evidence, and submits new evidence. Consistent with the following, we affirm. Judge’s Findings of Fact and Analysis Applicant is in his mid-30s and has been employed by a defense contractor as a systems server engineer since December 2021. He married in 2013 and divorced in 2020. He has one child from this marriage. He graduated from high school in 2008. He has held a security clearance since 2012. Between 2018 and 2022, Applicant accumulated nine delinquent accounts exceeding $42,000. He attributed his debts to immaturity and the availability of excessive credit. He engaged a credit repair service who has helped him with creditor payoffs and removals of debts from his credit report with disputes. Applicant was able to document a debt payoff, a settlement offer, and duplicate SOR allegations, but his submissions contain no documentation showing his satisfaction of the remaining debts. Deletion of accounts from a credit report does not equate to proof that the debts were resolved by means of voluntary, good-faith payments or other agreed settlement arrangement between the parties. The Judge held that without any documented evidence of Applicant’s resolution of the bulk of his debts with payoffs and payment plans, except in two cases, or good cause demonstrated for why debts have not been resolved, no mitigating condition applies. Applicant’s expressed commitments to address his still outstanding accounts with promised payments represent no more than promises to resolve his still outstanding debts and are not viable substitutes for a track record of paying debts in a timely manner and otherwise acting in a responsible way. Discussion In his appeal brief, Applicant claims that the Judge erred in certain factual findings with regard to his background, argues for reconsideration of certain efforts he has made to resolve debts, and includes additional evidence showing the current status of some debts. In deciding whether the Judge's rulings or conclusions are erroneous, we will review the decision to determine whether: it does not examine relevant evidence; it fails to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its conclusions, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made; it does not consider relevant factors; it reflects a clear error of judgment; it fails to consider an important aspect of the case; it offers an explanation for the decision that runs contrary to the record evidence; or it is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a mere difference of opinion. ISCR Case No. 97-0435 at 3 (App. Bd. Jul. 14, 1998). We agree that the Judge made factual errors in describing Applicant’s background, including his age, marital status, and current position held. The Judge’s confusion regarding certain background information, however, constitutes harmless error because it does not likely affect the outcome of the case. ISCR Case No. 19-01431 at 4 (App. Bd. Mar. 31, 2020). Applicant next asserts the Judge erred by not giving a settlement offer letter appropriate weight, and that more time was needed to show progress in settlement of this and other accounts. He argues that evidence of certain debt resolution efforts was not available when he responded to 2 the Government’s File of Relevant Material (FORM). Applicant offers new evidence in support of his assertions. In part, Applicant is advocating for an alternative weighing of the evidence. Disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence is not sufficient to conclude that the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. E.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007). Applicant has not established that the Judge committed harmful error. Our review of the record reflects that the Judge examined the relevant evidence and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, which is sustainable on this record. We have often stated that a security clearance adjudication is not a proceeding aimed at collecting an applicant’s debts. Rather, it is a proceeding aimed at evaluating an applicant’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. E.g., ISCR Case No. 07-08049 at 5 (App. Bd. Jul. 22, 2008). The scope of Guideline F encompasses not only an Applicant’s current financial situation, but also extends to his or her financial history. As a general rule, an applicant is not required to be debt-free nor to develop a plan for paying off all debts immediately or simultaneously. E.g., ISCR Case No. 09-08462 at 4 (App. Bd. May 31, 2011). However, an applicant must act responsibly given his or her circumstances and develop a reasonable plan for repayment, accompanied by concomitant conduct even if it may only provide for the payment of debts one at a time. ISCR Case No. 07-06482 at 3 (App. Bd. May 21, 2008). The Appeal Board has held that “it is reasonable for a Judge to expect applicants to present documentation about the satisfaction of specific debts.” ISCR Case No. 09-07091 at 2 (App. Bd. Aug. 11, 2010). Moreover, intentions to resolve financial problems in the future are not a substitute for a track record of debt repayment or other responsible approaches. E.g., ISCR Case No. 11- 14570 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 23, 2013). An applicant who waits until his clearance is in jeopardy before resolving debts may be lacking in the judgment and self-discipline expected of those with access to classified information. E.g., ISCR Case No. 16-01211 at 4 (App. Bd. May 30, 2018). Finally, with regard to additional or clarifying evidence presented on appeal, the Appeal Board is prohibited from considering new evidence on appeal and does not review cases de novo. Directive ¶ E3.1.29. Applicant has not established that the Judge committed harmful error. Our review of the record reflects that the Judge examined the relevant evidence and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, which is sustainable on this record. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). 3 ORDER The decision is AFFIRMED. 

APPEAL BOARD DECISION APPEARANCES FOR GOVERNMENT Julie R. Mendez, Esq., Chief Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Pro se The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On September 15, 2023, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). Applicant requested a decision based on the written record, without a hearing. The Government submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM) containing the entire record and the Government’s argument. Applicant was provided an opportunity to respond, but he did not submit a response. On March 21, 2024, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Roger C. Wesley denied Applicant’s security clearance eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. The SOR alleged under Guideline H that Applicant used marijuana with varying frequency from about June 2017 to March 2022; and that he used marijuana in March 2022, while granted access to classified information. Applicant admitted both SOR allegations, and the Judge found against him on both allegations. On appeal, Applicant contends the Judge failed to follow relevant law, regulations, and current research with regard to marijuana, and argued for reconsideration of the decision to deny him security eligibility. Consistent with the following, we affirm. Judge’s Findings of Fact and Analysis Applicant is in his mid-twenties and has been employed by a defense contractor since January 2023. He has held a security clearance since June 2021. He used marijuana with varying frequency in social situations from June 2017 to March 2022. He acknowledged using marijuana on one occasion in March 2022 while holding a security clearance and after receiving written notice of the restriction on illegal drug use as early as June 2021. He has not used marijuana since and recommitted to abstinence. The Judge found that Applicant committed to abstinence in 2021 but violated that commitment with his 2022 marijuana use. Despite his most recent commitment, it is too soon to absolve him of risks of recurrence. Discussion On appeal, Applicant contends the Judge’s decision was based on “outdated binding precedent” and claims the Judge disregarded current research on the effects of marijuana. He argues that Guideline H exists to “safeguard U.S. classified information from being illegally released due to impairment and susceptibility.” Appeal Brief at 1. He argues that his use of marijuana could not have created a security breach because he is diligent with his “interactions and language”; he used it at his home but was not adversely impaired; he avoids conversations about sensitive work while in social settings; and alcohol impairs the brain significantly more than marijuana. Id. Finally, Applicant pleads for reconsideration based on his age, reason, and mercy. There is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). After the Government produces evidence raising security concerns, an applicant bears the burden of persuasion concerning mitigation. See Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The standard applicable in security clearance decisions “is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Directive, Encl 2, App. A ¶ 2(b). In deciding whether the Judge’s rulings or conclusions are erroneous, we will review the Judge’s decision to determine whether: it does not examine relevant evidence; it fails to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its conclusions, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made; it does not consider relevant factors; it reflects a clear error of judgment; it fails to consider an important aspect of the case; it offers an explanation for the decision that runs contrary to the record evidence; or it is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a mere difference of opinion. E.g., ISCR Case No. 14-02563 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 28, 2015). Applicant’s assertions amount to a disagreement with Federal drug laws and policy. However, DOHA proceedings are not a proper forum to debate the pros and cons of whether marijuana should be legal for some purposes, how it should be classified as a controlled substance, 2 or the merits of DoD policy concerning drug abuse. E.g., ISCR Case No. 02-08613 at 2 (App. Bd. Jan. 6, 2005). The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) currently categorizes marijuana as a Schedule I drug and makes it illegal under Federal law to manufacture, possess, or distribute certain drugs, including marijuana. 21 U.S.C. § 801, § 812 § 844. The Supreme Court has ruled that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress may ban the use of cannabis even where states approve its use for medicinal purposes. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Although numerous states and the District of Columbia have legalized certain marijuana-related activity, there is no Federal exception for state-legalized marijuana. Applicant understates the concern expressed under Guideline H. 1 The Guideline H concern includes use of an illegal substance that can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, and a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. AG ¶ 24. The Judge found that Applicant’s conduct clearly implicates this concern, especially how the violation of his earlier commitment to abstinence and use while being granted access to classified information “raises continuing concerns about his trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment.” Decision at 6. We find the Judge’s reasoning and conclusions are supported by the evidence. With respect to Applicant’s marijuana use, he admitted that he used marijuana with varying frequency from 2017 to 2022, including in March 2022, after being granted access to classified information. This was a significant factor cited by the Judge that weighed against Applicant’s suitability for continuation of his security eligibility. In particular, an “expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue drug use” is disqualifying. AG ¶ 25(h). The record shows that Applicant completed security clearance applications (SCAs) in 2021 and 2023. In his June 2021 SCA, he stated “I mean I don’t plan on smoking weed anymore, but I might. It’s legal in my stated (sic), and unless the Government explicitly tells me I cannot, I might keep smoking. I don’t know though.” Government Exhibit (GE) 5. During Applicant’s personal subject interview (PSI) in July 2021, while discussing illegal drug use, he stated, “Never had a security clearance and will not engage in future with security clearance.” GE 6. In his 2023 SCA, he repeated his previous SCA drug use statement, but added, “After my last investigation, I took an edible (1) containing THC.” GE 3. In terms of eligibility for access to classified information, the Supreme Court's decision in Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), provides that the grant, denial, or revocation of an industrial security clearance is the exclusive province of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. See also Executive Order 10865. In Egan, the Court enunciated the general principle that “the grant of a security clearance to a particular [individual], a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call, is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch.” Id. at 527. The Court reasoned that the President’s “authority to classify and control access to information flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President [citing U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2] and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.” Id. 1 AG ¶ 24. The Concern. The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and nonprescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. 3 at 527, citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961). The Court stated further that “the authority to protect [national security] information falls on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief.” Id. State laws cannot override provisions of a Federal national security program under the exclusive auspices of the Executive Branch evaluating the security implications of an individual’s conduct. “[S]tate laws allowing for the legal use of marijuana in some limited circumstances do not pre-empt provisions of the Industrial Security Program, and the Department of Defense is not bound by the status of an applicant’s conduct under state law when adjudicating that individual’s eligibility for access to classified information.” ISCR Case No. 14-03734 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2016). A security clearance adjudication remains a determination that must be made within the confines of the basic premise that use of marijuana remains illegal under Federal law and illegal drug use is inconsistent with holding a security clearance. See ISCR Case No. 20-01772 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 14, 2021). Simply put, there is no exception that permits security clearance holders or applicants to use marijuana or any other drug that is illegal under Federal laws, regardless of state laws that may permit such use. Security clearance-related concerns arising from the legalization or decriminalization of marijuana in a number of states were addressed in an October 25, 2014, memo issued by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI Memo) and reiterated in clarifying guidance issued in 2021. Consistent with the discussion, above, the DNI Memo unequivocally states that "changes to state laws and the laws of the District of Columbia pertaining to marijuana use do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines. An individual's disregard of federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations." The DNI Memo also explicitly states that “under federal law, use of marijuana remains unlawful,” and “while several states have decriminalized marijuana or allowed its use for medical or recreational purposes, such use of marijuana remains subject to the applicable disqualifying conditions in the Directive.” See also ISCR Case No. 16-00258 at 2 (App. Bd. Feb. 23, 2018). The 2014 DNI Memo confirms that DOHA’s administrative judges retain significant latitude and discretion when evaluating an applicant’s suitability to hold a security clearance. In terms of possible mitigation of drug use, each case is fact-specific and, "[a]s always, adjudicative authorities are expected to evaluate claimed or developed use of, or involvement with, marijuana using the current adjudicative criteria." The DNI Memo is deferential to the adjudicative process, stating that the "adjudicative authority must determine if the use of, or involvement with, marijuana raises questions about the individual's judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and willingness to comply with law, rules, and regulations, including federal laws, when making eligibility decisions of persons proposed for, or occupying, national security positions." As the Appeal Board has previously stated, after applying for a security clearance and being adequately placed on notice that such conduct was inconsistent with holding a security clearance, an applicant who continues to use marijuana demonstrates a disregard for security clearance eligibility standards, and such behavior raises substantial questions about the applicant’s judgment, reliability, and willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. ISCR Case No. 21-02534 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 13, 2023). 4 Here, the Judge found that “Applicant’s use of marijuana while granted access to classified information makes it too soon to absolve him of risks of recurrence.” Decision at 6. Also, the Judge held that Applicant’s use of marijuana “after committing to abstinence in 2021 violated his abstinence commitment and raises continuing concerns about his trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment.” Id. Upon our review, the Judge’s findings are supported by substantial evidence of record, that is, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.” Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1. Finally, with regard to Applicant’s plea for reconsideration, we note that an applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate that the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. E.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007). Applicant has not established that the Judge committed harmful error. Our review of the record reflects that the Judge examined the relevant evidence and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, which is sustainable on this record. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). 5 Order The decision is AFFIRMED. 

APPEAL BOARD DECISION APPEARANCES FOR GOVERNMENT Julie R. Mendez, Esq., Chief Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Pro se The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On August 16, 2023, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On February 21, 2024, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Edward W. Loughran denied Applicant’s security clearance eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. The SOR alleged that Applicant used marijuana while granted access to classified information, from January 2022 to about June 2022; and that he used marijuana from January 2015 to about August 2017. The Judge found against Applicant on the allegation that he used marijuana from January 2022 to about June 2022 (but not while granted access to classified information), and in Applicant’s favor on the remaining SOR allegation. Consistent with the following, we affirm. On appeal, Applicant does not challenge any of the Judge’s findings of fact but asserts the Judge erred in the “overall unfavorable determination.” Appeal Brief at 1. Applicant focuses on a portion of the Judge’s findings of fact wherein the Judge quotes from Applicant’s witness: “He is praised for his dependability, responsibility, professionalism, loyalty, humility, trustworthiness, work ethic, honesty, reliability, dedication, patriotism, and integrity. He is recommended for a security clearance.” Decision at 2-3. Applicant states in his appeal; “It is my assertion that the intended outcome of Judge Loughran’s ruling was to deny my application for a top-secret security clearance, but not to render an overall unfavorable outcome and revocation of my active secret security clearance.” To the extent that Applicant disagrees with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, none of his arguments are sufficient to establish the Judge weighed the evidence in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Directive ¶ E3.132.3. The opinion of Applicant’s witness is not binding on the Administrative Judge. In DOHA proceedings, the determination of pertinent facts, policies and conclusions as to the allegations contained within an SOR and the ultimate question of whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or deny a security clearance rests solely with the Administrative Judge. Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). Moreover, to the extent that Applicant believes the Judge denied his top-secret clearance, but not his secret clearance, he misunderstands the security eligibility process and misreads the decision. The Judge ruled on Applicant’s security eligibility, not a particular clearance level. The level of clearance currently held, or the level of clearance applied for, do not affect the Judge's analysis or the Board's review. Directive ¶ 3.2 makes no distinction concerning basic clearance levels in its procedures for deciding whether access to classified information is clearly in the national interest. ISCR Case No. 05-11366 at 3 (App. Bd. Jan. 12, 2007). Possession of a previously granted clearance does not give rise to any right or vested interest, nor does any favorable clearance decision preclude the Government from reassessing a person’s security eligibility in light of current circumstances. ISCR Case No. 03-24144 at 6 (App. Bd. Dec. 6, 2005). Applicant has failed to establish that the Judge committed any harmful error or that he should be granted any relief on appeal. The Judge examined the relevant evidence and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, which is sustainable on the record. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). See also AG ¶ 2(b): “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” 2 Order The decision is AFFIRMED.